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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K.L.C. INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Counter Defendant 
vs. 
RON McLEAN 
Defendant-Appellant 
and Counter Plaintiff 
vs. 
KEARN'S LIQUIDATION CENTER, 
INO., a corporation, and JOHN PARAS, 
Counter Defendants--
Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K.L.C. INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Counter Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
RON McLEAN 
Defendant-Appellant 
and Counter Plaintiff 
APPEAL No. 18103 
vs. 
KEARN'S LIQUIDATION CENTER, 
INC., a corporation, and JOHN PARAS, 
Counter Defendants-
Respondents 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Defendant-Appellant files this Reply Brief to point out what he believes is 
a serious misstatement of fact regarding a recent case cited by respondents in their 
Brief. 
On page six of Respondent's Brief, respondents state that the facts in the 
Utah case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 76·5 (Utah 1980) show that: "Plaintiff began 
discovery procedures, but nine months later defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to diligently prosecute, ... ". Respondents contend that that case is similar to 
the present case where discovery proceedings had been diligently pursued for an 
extended period before the motion to dismiss was made. The actual facts in lVilson v. 
Lambert are stated on page 767 of the opinion as follows: 
On January 10, 1978, seven months later [after 
substitution of a new party plaintiff], and more 
than nine years after the original petition to review 
had been filed, the trial court sua sponte, issued an 
Order to the parties to appear and show cause why 
the action should not be dismissed because of failure 
to prosecute. Upon hearing argument on the 
matter, the Order to Show Cause was stricken and 
-erred to the trial calendar. 
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Nine months later, on October 3, 1978, 
defendant was served with Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories. Two Weeks thereafter, on October 
16, 1978, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure diligently to prosecute. (emphasis added). 
And further, at page 768: 
Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest personally 
delayed the consideration of the denied applications 
by the lower court from 1968 until the time of his 
death in 1975. Thereafter, plaintiffs, even following 
the approval of their purchase from Baldwin's estate 
by the probate court, delayed sixteen months before 
even inaugurating discovery in the matter. No 
explanation justifying such delay is offered in the 
arguments or in the record. The trial court's 
issuance of a Show Cause Order put them on ample 
notice that their clairrl was in jeopardy, yet they 
delayed going forward for the better part of a year. 
It is thus clear that in Wilson v. Lambert no discovery other than the mere 
serving of interrogatories had been pursued prior to the dismissal. The :Vlotion to 
Dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed just two weeks after interrogatories had 
been served, the interrogatories being the first action by any party after the period of 
inactivity. No answers had been filed or other actions taken by defendant prior to 
filing his motion. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute was timely filed 
before either party had spent extensive time and effort in prosecuting the action or 
preparing for trial. In the present case, the action had been actively 
prosecuted by both parties for over one and one-half years before the Motion to 
Dismiss was made. A deposition of one of the respondents had been taken and he had 
submitted answers to interrogatories. It is submitted that the Wilson case is clearly 
not similar to the p·resent one. 
Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. Brown, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 1969) is 
also distinguishable from the present facts. In Brasher, the issue was whether the 
court had authority to dismiss the action sua sponte under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. In that case, it was held that the court had such authority when 
neither party had prosecuted the action for o\ ~" , __ ,~··-.. -=---9-·-__,-~, _,,~ """'at the 
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result would have been if both parties, prior to the sua sponte dismissal, had 
reactivated the litigation after a long period of inactivity was not addressed by the 
court. 
Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) is applicable to the 
present case. In Johnson, the court reversed a dismissal for lack of prosecution where 
both parties had been unexplainably inactive for nearly four years and where either 
party could have brought the action to a conclusion during that period. The fact that 
one party hired new counsel to reactivate the litigation supported the contention that 
the trial court abused its discretion. In the present case, all parties had been 
unexplainably inactive for a long period of time prior to appellant obtaining a new 
attorney and diligently prosecuting the case and, during that period of inactivity, any 
of the parties could have brought the action to a conclusion. Furthermore, all parties 
in the present case had reactivated the litigation over one and one-half years before 
the Motion to Dismiss was made. 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, 
Inc., 544 P .2d 876 (Utah 1975), the case relied upon by respondents as the "key" case in 
this Court's line of cases dealing with dismissals for lack of prosecution, and a case 
where the lower court's dismissal was reversed, the Court stated at pages 878-879: 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition 
the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move for ward according to the rules 
and the directions of the court, without justifiable 
excuse. But that prerogative falls short of 
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result 
in injustice. Whether there is such justifiable 
excuse is to be determined by considering more 
factors than merely the length of time since the suit 
was filed. Some cons id era tion should be o-iven to 0 
the conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity 
each has had to move the case forward and what 
they have done about it; and also what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; 
and most important, whether injustice may result 
-"--.- ~ ~L·::: ·~i_:::.:.:.~ __ :::sal. 
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Here, none of the parties took any action to advance the litigation to a 
conclusion until appellant began diseovery proceedings and had the case set for trial. 
Although the long delay between filing the complaint and a trial in this matter may 
cause some hardship to the parties, both parties are affected equally. Defendant-
Appellant submits that, most importantly, an injustice is done if he is denied his day in 
court. 
As stated by this Court in the Westinghouse case: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in 
order to keep them up to date. But it is even more 
important to keep in mind that the very reason for 
the existence of courts is to afford disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them. 
Respectfully, 
MALLINCKRODT & MALLINCKRODT 
tZJ-J--1<. ~ ,,,,.--
Robert R. :\1allinckrodt 
CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE 
The foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was served on plaintiff-respondent 
and counter defendants-respondents by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to Earl S. Spafford, Esq., Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen, 311 South 
-r'--Sta te, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, their attorneys, this /S' day of June, 
1982. 
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